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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Interest spread, the difference between what a bank earns on its assets and what it pays 
on its liabilities, has been on an upward trend during the last few years: during 2005 the 
average interest spread of the banking sector has increased by 2.14 percent. An increase in the 
interest spread implies that either the depositor or the borrower or both stand to loose. In the 
context of developing economies, the lack of alternate avenues of financial intermediation 
aggravates the adverse impact of increase in spread.1  Interest spread also has implications for 
the effectiveness of the bank lending channel. For example, with a commitment to market 
based monetary policy, the central bank influences the yield on treasury bills (T. bill hereafter) 
that in turn affects the deposit and lending rates.2  The change in these rates influences the cost 
of capital that in turn affects the level of consumption and investment in the economy. If the 
pass-through of the changes in yield on T. bill rate to the deposit and lending rates is 
asymmetric then this changes the spread, for better or worse, depending upon the nature of 
asymmetry. If the increase in spread is due to lower return to depositors then this discourages 
savings; alternatively if it is due to higher charge on loans, investment decisions are affected. 
In either case the increase in spread has an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of bank 
lending channel of monetary policy and has therefore important implications for the 
economy.3  
This paper explores the determinants of interest spread in Pakistan focusing in 
particular on inelasticity of deposits supply to the banks and industry concentration. 
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1For example Peria and Moody (2004) argue that the impact of increase in spread could be severe as the 
capital markets are relatively less developed and a sizable percentage of agents depend on banks for their 
financial needs. 
2For a comprehensive discussion on channels of monetary policy, see Mishkin (1995). 
3For discussion and empirical evidence regarding the impact of monetary policy on the level of real 
economic activity, see Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Romer and Romer (1989), and Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992). Also, Samuel and Valderrama (2006) find that wide bank spreads in Barbados may have contributed to 
low rates of private investment and economic growth. 
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Another question addressed in the paper is: should the proposed bank Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&As) be reviewed by, besides the central bank, antitrust/competition 
authority as well. In general, antitrust authorities review mergers from the perspective of 
the latter’s impact upon competitive environment. Banking industry in Pakistan is 
currently witnessing a growing trend towards Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), not 
least because of impending implementation4 of Basel Accord II to which Pakistan is a 
signatory. To ensure that the banks remain financially sound, the accord links the capital 
that a bank is required to hold with its risk weighted assets (RWA) and requires that the 
capital of a bank be 8 percent of the bank’s risk weighted assets. Accordingly, the State 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has asked commercial banks to raise their capital gradually to the 
level of Rs 6 billion, till the end of 2009. Some of the banks that have less capital than the 
required level and/or are facing difficulties in raising capital through equity injection or 
reinvestment of profits are opting for mergers to bring their capital to the requisite level.  
Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature on determinants of interest 
spread. Section 3 spells out the methodology whereas Section 4 presents the empirical 
findings. Section 5 examines the case for allowing the antitrust/competition authority to 
review proposed mergers if the competition stands to reduce below a certain specified 
threshold level. Section 6 concludes the discussion. 
     
2.  DETERMINANTS OF INTEREST SPREAD: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A substantial body of literature has explored various determinants of interest 
spread including: (i) market structure of the industry; (ii) bank specific factors; (iii) 
macroeconomic variables; and (iv) financial regulations. The industrial organisation 
literature predicts that an oliogopolistic market structure may result in higher spreads 
[Samuel and Valderrama (2006)], though the empirical evidence on this count is mixed. 
Hannan and Liang (1993) and Bajaras, Steiner, and Salazar (1999), among others, 
suggest that industry concentration may lead to higher spread. However, Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) argue that a better measure of competition is contestability, proxied by 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) measure of bank behavioural response. The authors find that 
contestability is enhanced by free entry and lesser regulations.  Ho and Saunders (1981) 
view the bank as ‘a dealer’, a demander of deposit and supplier of loans. According to 
this study, bank interest margin depends on four factors: (i) the degree of bank’s 
management risk aversion; (ii) market structure of the industry; (iii) average size of bank 
transactions; and (iv) the variance of interest rates. The authors also make the point that a 
number of imperfections and regulatory restrictions have an impact upon spread. They 
consider the probability of loan defaults and opportunity cost of holding mandatory 
reserves as additional variables that influence the spread, though these are not included in 
their theoretical model. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
To examine the determinants of interest spread for Pakistan’s banking industry, we 
employ a variant of the model used by Peria and Mody (2004). The original motivation is 
from the dealership model of bank spreads developed by Ho and Saunders (1981), 
 
4The accord is to be implemented from January 2008. 
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extended by Allen (1988) and Angbazo (1989). These models predict that market 
structure of the banking sector, macroeconomic variables, operating costs, regulatory 
costs and the credit risk can affect spreads. In addition, we include another variable viz. 
inelasticity of deposit supply to banks as a determinant of interest spread. This variable 
can also be thought of as insensitivity of deposits to interest rate. Our model is:  
ititit eXy +β+α= Ο  … … … … … … (1) 
Where yit is interest spread defined as the difference between interest earned on average 
assets and interest paid on average liabilities, (α0, β) is a vector of parameters, eit is a 
stochastic error term, and Xit is a vector of explanatory variables that includes:  
Industry Variables:  
 (i) Concentration 
 (ii) Deposit Inelasticity  
Firm Variables: 
 (i) Market share 
 (ii) Liquidity 
 (iii) Administrative cost 
 (iv) Non performing loans  
 (v) Equity 
Macro Variables: 
 (i) Real Output 
 (ii) Inflation  
 (iii) Real interest rate.  
The literature on industrial organisation offers two competing hypotheses. The 
structure-conduct-performance (s-c-p) hypothesis holds that market concentration 
encourages collusion that in turn enables the firms in the industry to engage in rent-
seeking. The (s-c-p) is based on the axiom that sellers’ concentration lowers the cost of 
collusion and therefore allows the firms to engage in tacit/explicit collusion. Given 
market power a bank would pay relatively less on its liabilities and earn more on its 
assets, thereby increasing the spread. If s-c-p holds then the coefficient on the 
concentration variable has a positive sign. 
Efficient-structure hypothesis on the other hand asserts that concentration is the 
consequence of the efficient operations of the leading firms in the industry. Because of 
their efficient operations these firms earn economic or Ricardian rent. To the extent that 
efficiency is represented by lower marginal cost of producing output of a given quality, 
banks in concentrated markets should find it advantageous to offer higher interest on 
loans and charge lower interest on deposits, thereby decreasing the spread. Thus if the 
efficient-structure hypothesis holds then the coefficient on the concentration variable has 
a negative sign. The two hypotheses have been tested extensively for the banking 
industry as well [see Berger and Hannan (1989]. 
Of the two competing hypotheses, we test for the s-c-p only. We do not test for 
efficient-structure hypothesis because our a priori belief is that concentration of banking 
industry in Pakistan, of whatever degree, is not the result of the efficient operations of the 
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leading firm in the industry—the basis of the hypothesis. Rather we argue that the 
concentration is due to restricted entry. To elaborate, Pakistan’s banking industry mainly 
constitutes three heterogeneous groups of banks: (i) the five major banks5, that were 
nationalised in 1973 and four of them have been privatised, one by one, between 1991 
and 2002; (ii) domestic banks, that were allowed to be opened in private sector from 1991 
onwards; and (iii) foreign banks that till recent past were allowed to operate only through 
limited number of branches. Given this characterisation of the banking industry it is 
obvious that till 1991 the five nationalised banks mainly constituted the banking industry 
and hence the concentration. This has little to do with efficient operations. Rather, 
perhaps the lack of competition adversely influenced the efficiency of these banks. Even 
now it is not implausible to assume that hang over from the past, at least to some extent, 
persists.   
We argue that inelasticity of deposit supply to banks or the interest insensitivity of 
deposits is also a determinant of spread. Theoretically, changes in T-bill rate are passed 
on to the deposit and lending rates of the banks. Greater the inelasticity of deposits the 
less compelled a bank would be to pass on the increase in T-bill rate to deposits, thereby 
increasing the interest spread. Therefore we hypothesise a positive sign on inelasticity of 
deposit supply. 
Besides concentration and inelasticity of deposit supply, the remaining variables in 
Equation (1) are control variables.  High liquidity ratio, whether self imposed or the result 
of regulations, inflicts a cost upon banks as they have to give up the opportunity of 
investing these funds in alternate high yielding assets, like loans. Accordingly the 
coefficient is hypothesised to have a positive sign. Liquidity is measured as the ratio of 
banks liquid assets to total assets. If banks intermediation cost (i.e. administrative cost) is 
high, they are likely to offset it by charging their customers higher spread. Non 
performing loan (NPL) negatively affects the spread. This variable captures the credit 
risk. Higher the credit risk, higher the spread is likely to be. The reason is that the equity 
holders demand risk adjusted return. To put it more simply given a targeted spread, the 
actual spread varies positively with NPLs, because what the bank fails to recover from 
the not-so-good borrower it attempts to recover from the good ones, thereby raising the 
spread. Holding large equity, whether on a voluntary basis or as consequence of a 
regulation, is costly and therefore varies positively with spread. Banks market share is the 
ratio of each bank’s deposits to total system’s deposits. To the extent that the market 
share gets translated into market power, the relationship between market share and spread 
is hypothesised to be positive. However larger banks may reap scale economies and 
transfer some of the benefits to their customers in the shape of lower spread. Given the 
conflicting expectations the ultimate hypothesised sign of market share is held 
ambiguous. 
Given that interest spreads can be influenced by macroeconomic environment we 
control for real output, inflation and the policy interest rate (T. bill rate).  Real output 
growth is included to capture the affect of business cycles discussed by Bernanke and 
Girtler (1989). The authors argue that borrowers’ creditworthiness is countercyclical. The 
reason is that slowdown in economic activity affects borrowers’ fortunes and hence their 
 
5National Bank of Pakistan , Habib Bank Ltd., United Bank Ltd., Muslim Commercial Bank, Allied 
Bank Ltd.  
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creditworthiness. The change in creditworthiness would affect the lending rate charged to 
the borrower that would be reflected in the changed spread. Inflation is included because 
if inflation shocks are not passed on equally in terms of magnitude as well as speed to 
deposit and lending rate then the spread would change. Finally we include the interest 
rate that reflects monetary policy stance; again if the changes in policy rate are not 
transmitted equally, to the deposit and lending rates then the spread would be influenced.  
Interest Spread is measured as the return on average assets minus the cost of 
average funds. Return on average assets has been worked out as the total interest income 
earned over average assets. The average assets include average loans and advances plus 
liquid, interest earning investments. All averages have been worked out by taking average 
of the balances held at the beginning and end of the year. Average cost of funds is 
worked out as total interest paid by the bank over all borrowed funds (Deposits plus 
Borrowings). Concentration is measured by Hirschmann-Herfindhal index.  
We use the interest insensitive deposit accounts as proxy for the inelasticity of 
deposit supply to the banking industry.  We view, deposit accounts, other then deposits of 
fixed maturities as interest insensitive. Thus the ones considered interest insensitive are 
Current Account, Savings Account and other accounts. The current account does not pay 
any interest and is thus obviously interest insensitive. The account holder deposits money 
in this account for features other than generation of interest income. These features 
include the option to withdraw large sums of money at no or very short notice and the use 
of bank’s clearing facilities to execute monetary transactions. A customer may like to 
have a current account in one or the other bank due to difference, in service quality and 
location etc. among the banks, but given his reasons for depositing, he cannot take money 
out of the banking system. Thus for the industry as a unit the supply on this count is 
inelastic.  
Savings Account offers relatively low rate of interest as compared to Fixed 
Deposit Accounts, but allows the depositor to withdraw his money at will without any 
penalty being charged. The depositors placing money in Savings Account are, typically, 
small account holders who cannot predict as to when they would have to withdraw. The 
uncertainty about the timing of withdrawal, short period for which the depositor wants to 
place money in the bank and smaller amount of money that is available for placement, 
extremely limits depositors’ alternate options for placement of funds. This is especially 
true for Pakistan where capital markets are insufficiently developed, investment in 
securities traded at stock market is perceived very risky, given the fluctuations in stock 
prices and other investment opportunities are considered less liquid. In sum, again, for the 
banking industry as a single unit the supply of deposit in savings account is more or less 
inelastic. Other deposit accounts constitute a negligible percentage of the total deposits 
and their inclusion on either side is not likely to alter the results. We consider these as 
interest insensitive and hence their supply to banks as inelastic. 
Market share of each bank is the bank’s total deposits as percentage of the total 
industry deposits. Liquidity is measured as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. 
Administrative cost is the ratio of bank’s administrative expenses to bank’s total assets, 
NPLs is the ratio of provisions for bad and doubtful debts to earning assets and Equity is 
the ratio of bank’s equity to total assets. Data on the variables referred so far are from 
‘Banking Statistics of Pakistan’ published annually by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The 
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data on the three macroeconomic variables, viz. Real output growth, inflation and 
monetary policy rate (six-months T.Bill rate is used as the policy rate) are from annual 
reports of SBP. 
Panel data of 29 banks (see list in Annex-A) for the period from 1998 to 2005 are 
employed in the study. As of now the commercial banks number 35, however to have 
balanced data we have excluded the banks that were non-existent in 1998. Similarly the 
banks that do not exist today but were operating in 1998 have not been included. The use 
of panel data allows us to identify and measure effects that are simply not detectable in 
pure cross-section or pure time-series data. Models based on panel data can be estimated 
using either the random effects model or the fixed effects model. The random effects 
model assumes the exogeneity of all the regressors with random individual effects while 
fixed effects model allows for the endogeneity of all the regressors with these effects 
[Baltagi (2001)]. As we have no reason to assume that regressors included in our model 
are exogenous therefore we use the fixed effects model.                                         
 
4.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Parameters estimates obtained from Equation (1) are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Coefficient Estimates of Equation (1) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Concentration –0.002 –0.97 
Inelasticity 0.17 1.98 
Liquidity 0.03 2.59 
Market Share 0.03 1.67* 
Equity 0.009 0.40 
Non-performing Loans 0.02 1.72* 
Administrative Cost 0.17 1.66* 
GDP Growth –0.55 –3.07 
Inflation –0.08 0.59 
Interest Rate 0.23 1.64* 
* Significant at 10 percent level. 
 
The variables of our interest are inelasticity of deposit supply and concentration. 
Inelasticity of deposit supply has a positive and significant impact on spread whereas 
concentration does not cause a statistically significant influence upon interest spread. We 
argue that the very high level of inelastic deposit supply leaves little incentive to the 
bankers to adopt competitive practices and therefore the concentration ratio, which 
captures the level of competition, fails to exercise an influence upon spread. To elaborate, 
it is important to note that inelastic deposits constituted as much as 81 percent of the total 
industry deposits in 2005 (Table 2). Fixed deposits as percentage of industry deposits 
have been declining with the decline in interest rate [T.bill rate, (Column 4)], thus 
pointing towards the elastic/interest sensitive nature of fixed deposits. The decline in 
fixed deposits has in turn increased the composition of inelastic deposits. With the 
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disintermediation of fixed deposits from the banking system, the banks, being left largely 
with inelastic deposits, were not too inclined to pay attractive returns on deposits, hence 
the rise in spread.6 It is also apparent from Table 2 that the composition of deposits in 
1998 had a clear tilt towards inelastic deposits. This tilt continued to aggravate during 
most of the data span. The interest spread (column 4) increased by 2.14 percent in 2005 
owing to a 2.86 percent increase in interest earned on earning assets but only 0.72 percent 
increase in the cost of bank funds (that mainly includes interest paid to depositors). 
 
Table 2 
Deposit Supply Elasticity and Interest Spread (Percent) 
Year 
Inelastic: 
Current + Savings + Others 
Elastic: 
Fixed 
Interest 
Spread 
Six months 
T. Bill 
Rate 
1998 67 33 7.38 11.87 
1999 69 31 7.68 10.10 
2000 71 29 7.82 10.96 
2001 75 25 8.69 7.93 
2002 77 23 6.75 4.32 
2003 85 15 4.84 1.64 
2004 83 17 4.51 3.73 
2005 81 19 6.65 8.25 
   
The observed negative relationship of interest spread with real output (Table 1), is 
in accordance with the business cycles effect discussed by Barnanke and Girtler (1989). 
As mentioned earlier, according to the authors, during recession the creditworthiness of 
the borrower declines and therefore he can borrower only at a higher interest rate, and 
this raises the spread. Therefore we observe a negative relationship between spread and 
real output. The positive relationship of the spread with liquidity is due the fact that as the 
liquidity increases, the bank’s appetite for deposits decreases therefore the bank pays less 
on deposits thereby raising the spread. The positive relationship of interest spread with 
non-performing loans and administrative cost implies that as the profitability of the bank 
decreases due to increase in non-performing loans or administrative cost, the bank 
recoups the losses by increasing the spread, that is, either charging more on loans or 
paying less to depositors or some combination of the two. Finally the positive 
relationship of the spread with market share implies that higher market share gets 
translated into higher market power thereby enabling the bank to raise the spread to the 
detriment of its customers. Its noteworthy here that we hypothesised an ambiguous sign 
on market share because increase in market share may allow the bank to reap scale 
economies and thereby allow the bank to transfer some of the benefits to its customers in 
the shape of lower spread. The fact that the sign on market share is not negative implies 
that scale economies perspective is not valid in case of Pakistan’s banking industry. 
 
6It is no coincidence that the period (i.e. 2002-04) during which the percentage of fixed deposits was 
very low, real estate prices in Pakistan were on the rise and had skyrocketed by 2004. This implies that at least 
some part of the fixed deposits withdrawn from the banking system had probably ended up in real estate market. 
This also points towards the lack of alternate depository avenues. 
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5.  BANK MERGERS 
In recent years, there has been a growing trend towards Mergers and Acquisitions 
in the banking sector. Austin (2002) argues that poorly conceived or badly executed 
M&As can present risks to the participating banks, the banking system and other 
economic sectors [Austin (2002)].  M&As on the one hand allow the merging banks to 
reap scale economies thereby improving efficiency, on the other hand these tend to lessen 
competition. Given the adverse impact of M&As on competition, merger proposals in 
number of countries are scrutinised and at times even blocked if the degree of 
competition is expected to fall below a certain threshold level due to merger/acquisition. 
We find that concentration ratio in banking industry is close to the conventional threshold 
level of 1000 and any further decrease in competition due to mergers may call for review 
from antitrust perspective. 
In the United States, mergers and acquisitions, besides being approved by the Fed, 
require approval by another agency that specifically looks into mergers. Additionally, the 
antitrust division of the department of justice issues advisory reports on competitive 
aspects of all bank mergers and is empowered to bring suit against merger proposal that it 
believes will have significant adverse impact on competition. As of now, the scrutiny and 
the approval of the banking mergers in Pakistan fall under the sole jurisdiction of the 
State Bank of Pakistan, the regulator of banks. Neither the criteria employed for the 
purpose are easily available, nor an institutional mechanism exists to seek public opinion 
or take into account grievances of the stake holders, especially those of depositors. It is 
worth mentioning here that a proviso of the code Good Transparency Practices for 
Financial Policies by Financial Agencies developed by IMF7 says that: 
Financial policies should be communicated to the public in an open manner, 
compatible with confidentiality considerations and the need to preserve 
effectiveness of actions. 
According to Austin (2002) the objective of the review by the antitrust authorities 
is:  
“a determination of whether, within the identified geographic and product markets, 
the effect of transaction will be to substantially lessen competition”. 
Typically, the likely affect of M &As on competition is tested by employing a 
measure of industry concentration. More often the concentration is measured in terms of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). The HHI measures industry concentration in terms of 
relative size of the competitors. Adding the squares of market shares of all banks in the 
industry, yields the HHI. The credit market share or deposit market share is used as a 
measure of the market share. The HHI approaches zero when market is served by large 
number of players of equal size and it goes to 10,000 in case of a perfect monopoly. Under 
the merger guidelines published by antitrust division of United States, an industry, other 
then banking, with post-merger HHI below 1000, is considered un-concentrated; between 
1000 and 1800, as moderately concentrated and above 1800 as highly concentrated. In 
 
7International Monetary Fund, Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial 
Policies: Declaration of Principles, (September 26, 1999), and related Factsheet entitled Transparency in 
Monetary and Financial Policies (March 2001). 
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industries, other then banking, a merger generating a raise of 50 points or more in HHI in a 
highly concentrated industry raises significant concerns. However in banking industry, the 
US department of Justice allows an increase of 200 points. In US, the higher than normal 
threshold concentration levels for banking industry are meant to take into account the 
competitive effect of limited purpose lenders, that are alternate to banks, such as credit 
unions, saving and loans association and other non-depository institutions. However in 
Pakistan the competition to banking industry from other Depository/lending institution 
being non-existent, as emphasised by our finding regarding the main determinant of interest 
spread, one cannot convincingly argue for applying a concentration ratio higher than that 
applicable to other industries. We feel that research avenue exists for developing our own 
threshold concentration level based upon specifics of the industry. But for the moment, 
given the absence of financial intermediaries that serve as alternate to banks, we take the 
general US criteria, that is, HHI above 1000 points and raise of 50 points due to merger as 
the condition that would call for review of M&As proposal by antitrust/competition 
authority (see Annex-B for an illustration of HHI index).  
The actual trend of banking industry’s concentration based on HHI is presented 
below (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Banking Industry: Concentration 
Year Concentration Ratio (HHI) 
1998 1,385 
1999 1,446 
2000 1,403 
2001 1,320 
2002 1,200 
2003 1,112 
2004 1,030 
2005   912 
Source: Based on Deposit Market Share. 
 
Though the industry concentration had been on a declining course (Table 4) but it 
is still close to the threshold level that should invite review from antitrust perspective. A 
merger or two can push the concentration above the threshold level of 1000.  Whatever 
the concentration level it is useful to examine the cause of decline in concentration. This 
cause is apparent from a look at the trend of market share composition, presented below 
in Table 4. 
 It is clear from Table 4 that the five major banks that had been in the market for a 
long time now and were protected from competition due to restricted entry till 1991 have 
lost a significant part of their market share to private banks with opening up of the 
banking industry to the private sector. (The share of foreign banks, not shown in the 
table, has not seen a significant shift).    
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Table 4 
Deposit Market Share 
 Five Major 
Domestic Banks 
Banks Established in 
Private Sector since 1991 
1998 74.4 10.6 
1999 76.9 10.4 
2000 75.1 11.9 
2001 72.2 14.8 
2002 68.9 17.7 
2003 66.2 20.7 
2004 62.4 24.4 
2005 57.8 29.0 
 
Using an actual case from Pakistan’s banking industry, as an illustration, we make 
the point that taking into account pre and post concentration ratios is important while 
approving bank mergers. In year 2001 United Bank Limited (UBL), then a nationalised 
bank, was put up for sale under the privatisation program. Muslim Commercial Bank 
(MCB) that had already been privatised by then, made a bid for UBL and its bid being the 
highest, the sale was initially approved but was later withdrawn given concerns raised in 
the print and electronic Media. Based on the market share enjoyed by the two banks, we 
present below what the pre and post merger concentration ratios (HHIs) would have been, 
had the proposed Acquisition gone through. 
The figures given in Table 5 indicate that had the proposed acquisition 
materialised, the industry concentration, measured by HHI would have gone up 219 
points which is much more than the 50 points criteria argued earlier. The second 
condition of the criteria is that the post merger concentration ratio should be more than 
1000 points. The table shows that this condition is also fulfilled. Thus given our criteria 
the proposed acquisition of UBL by MCB should have attracted review by 
antitrust/competition authority and the merger should not have been allowed had the 
sponsors failed to satisfy the authority that there are socially beneficial factors that would 
offset the adverse impact of reduced competition. This is the practice in countries where 
the mergers fall under the jurisdiction of antitrust authority. 
Once it is agreed upon that bank mergers need to be subjected to review from 
antitrust perspective the issue arises that which agency should conduct the review; the 
regulator (central bank) or some antitrust/competition authority. Austin (2002) argues 
that regulator’s interest in preserving the stability of the banking system leans towards 
greater concentration while public’s objective of maximising its return calls for a 
competitive banking industry. As central bank is a party to the conflict, it is not 
appropriate for it to conduct review from antitrust perspective. However, the central bank 
is still the most suitable authority for looking into mergers from other perspectives like 
financial soundness. The middle ground then is that the central bank should accord 
merger approval while at the same time the antitrust authority should have the power to 
block mergers if these carry the potential to reduce competition below a certain specified 
degree. 
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Table 5 
Banking Industry Concentration HHI:  
Pre and Post-proposed Acquisition of UBL by MCB in 2001 
 
Deposits 
(Rs. in Bil.) 
Market Share 
(Deposit) 
(%) 
Contribution 
to HHI 
(Square: col. 3) 
Pre-Merger    
    MCB 155 10.93 120 
    UBL 141 9.94 99 
    All Banks 1,418   
    MCB and UBL   219 
    HHI (Industry)   1320* 
Post-Merger    
    MCB-UBL (Merged) 296 20.87 436 
    All Banks 1418   
    HHI (Industry)   1539* 
Increase in Industry 
Concentration Due to Merger   219 
*Worked out separately taking into account deposit market share of 29 banks (list at Annex A).  
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This study has investigated the determinants of interest spread of the banking 
industry in Pakistan, and has explored whether there exists a case for bringing 
banking mergers and acquisitions under the purview of antitrust authority. Given the 
specific features of banking industry in Pakistan such as the non-existence of 
financial intermediaries that can serve as an alternative to banks for small savers, we 
included inelasticity of deposit supply to banks as a determinant of interest spread. 
The results show that inelasticity of deposit supply has a positive and significant 
impact on spread whereas concentration does not cause a statistically significant 
influence upon interest spread. We argue that the very high level of inelastic deposit 
supply leaves little incentive to the bankers to adopt competitive practices and 
therefore the concentration ratio, which captures the level of competition, fails to 
exercise an influence upon spread. We feel that the emergence of alternate financial 
intermediaries is essential for lowering the spread. Meanwhile, the regulator can 
perhaps play some role in lowering the spread. 
Secondly the study has explored the question of whether or not the on going 
M&As in Pakistan’s banking industry should fall under the jurisdiction of antitrust 
authority. Given that current level of industry concentration is close to the threshold level 
found in literature for initiating such review, we feel that there is a case for bringing 
M&As under antitrust review. At present no law in this respect exists in Pakistan. We 
hasten to add that central should enjoy the veto over the decision in favour of M&As but 
the antitrust/competition authority should enjoy the power to block M&As if these are 
considered inimical to public interest. 
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Annexure-A   
Banks Included in the Study 
1 Allied Bank of Pakistan 
2 Askari Bank Limited 
3 Al-Habib Bank Limited 
4 My Bank Limited 
5 First Woman Bank 
6 Habib Bank Limited 
7 Alfalah Bank Limited 
8 Metropolitan Bank Limited 
9 Muslim Commercial Bank 
10 National Bank of Pakistan 
11 Prime Bank Limited 
12 Soneri Bank Limited 
13 Union Bank Limited 
14 United Bank Limited 
15 Faysal Bank Limited 
16 Bank of Punjab 
17 Khyber Bank Limited 
18 PICIC Commercial Bank 
19 AL-Baraka Limited  
20 ABN Amro 
21 American Express Bank 
22 Oman Bank Limited 
23 Tokyo Bank  
24 Citi Bank 
25 Deutsche Bank 
26 Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 
27 Hong-Shinghai Bank 
28 Rupali Bank 
29 Standard Charterd Bank 
 
Annexure-B 
 
The operation of Herschman-Herfindhal index is described below.  
Assume that the six banks indicated in the table below constitute the banking 
industry. Each of the four of the banks in the industry enjoy 20 percent share of the 
market. The two other banks are relative smaller with 10 percent share each of the 
market. We show below what happens to the HHI in case of merger of two large banks, 
A & B (with share of 20 percent each), a large bank and a small one, D & F (with share 
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of 20 percent and 10 percent respectively) and two small banks E & F ( with market share 
of 10 percent each). It is evident from the table that merger between two large banks is 
potentially more harmful from competitive point of view, as it increases concentration by 
800 points while merger between two small banks causes an increment of 200 hundred 
points in concentration. 
 
Concentration Ratio  
Post Merger Scenarios: Banks 
 
Market 
Share      
(%) 
Pre-Merger 
HHI A&B 
HHI 
D&E 
HHI 
E&F 
HHI 
A 20 400 – 400 400 
B 20 400 1600 400 400 
C 20 400 400 400 400 
D 20 400 400 900 400 
E 10 100 100 – 400 
F 10 100 100 100  
HHI  1800 2600 2200 2000 
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Comments  
 
This study is a good attempt to measure the extent to which the changes in the 
variables related with market structure of the industry, bank specific indicators, 
macroeconomic indicators and financial regulations explain the variation in interest rate 
spread. I have some suggestions which may help to improve the paper.  
• All variables and terms should be defined clearly such as ‘Industry 
Concentration’, Banking concentration ratio, ‘non-performing loans’ 
‘Herischmann-Herfindhal index’, ‘structure-conduct-performance’, or at least 
give reference that interested reader will be able to read about them. 
• In explaining the results authors say that the increase in spread indicates increase 
in profitability. But it is not necessary, it may mean rising inefficiency if spread 
increases due rising operating cost [see Siddiqui and Siddiqui (1998)]. 
• The role of private investment in determining the spread has been ignored, why? 
• Liquidity ratio depends on GDP, bank investment in Treasury Bills, thus the 
model can be estimated in the form of recursive model. Otherwise it may face 
endogeniety problem. 
• On page 1 para 2 ‘with a commitment to market based monetary policy the 
central bank influence the yield on T-bill’ I think if there is emphasis on free 
market then bank influence on T-bill contradict free market rule. 
• Is it correct statement on page 6 second para “…charge (Offer?) lower interest 
on deposits and offer (charge?) higher interest on loans”. It seems that terms out 
side bracket should be replaced by the terms inside bracket. 
• Fixed and random effect model can be used to measure the impact before and 
after 1999—the year of major reforms in financial sector. 
• If separate regressions are estimated for the banks which were non-existent 
before 1998 and exist after 1998 and vice versa and comparison of the results 
will show the major reason of losing a bank. The reason may lie in the demand 
and supply of the services by location. 
• Inelasticity of deposit supply may be measured as the ratio of current to total 
number of deposits over time. 
• The study show adverse impact of merger on competition but it is not mentioned 
how it affects spread. 
• It would also be important to point out some peculiar characteristics of What 
happened to cost of intermediation? Administrative cost? And financial 
development indicators during the pre- and post-reform period? What happened 
to key financial development indicators during the pre- and post-reforms period. 
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In brief, the authors have done very good jobs. However, if authors incorporate 
these few points, then paper increase their effective power and become more reader 
friendly. 
 
Rizwana Siddiqui 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics,  
Islamabad. 
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